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Citizen Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes: Blaming Americans for
War Crimes in Iraq
Abstract
This chapter takes seriously the notion that individuals may bear responsibility for the transgressions of their
group even where they do not bear the hallmarks of individual culpability. More specifically, I shall contend
that citizenship itself can ground responsibility for the crimes of one’s nation-state. I seek to locate and
interrogate the grounds upon which we may, in the first instance, hold group members responsible for a
transgression of their group. The focus here is then on responsibility assigned directly to members, and not
derivative of the responsibility of the group.
The account of citizen responsibility that I advance differs from an individualist account insofar as it severs
moral and causal responsibility: I argue that the citizen may bear moral responsibility even though she did not
participate in, facilitate, or even tolerate the abuses committed in her midst. The account also severs the
notions of guilt and blameworthiness: I argue that the citizen may be an appropriate object of blame (and
hence appropriately subject to resentment and indignation) even though she need not conceive of herself as
guilty. Finally, I suggest that this fracturing of the traditional troika of guilt, resentment, and indignation has
implications for the way we think about moral responsibility more generally.
I begin by articulating an account of the relationship between the citizen and her nation-state that grounds the
citizen’s responsibility for a transgression of her nation-state independent of the extent of her participation in
that transgression. I do not anticipate, however, that that account will induce guilt in every American who
encounters it. The resistance to guilt is itself interesting and, in the second Part of the paper, I seek to
investigate its source. To that end, I undertake an exploration of the moral psychology of guilt and resentment,
especially as these emotions pertain to understandings of responsibility for war crimes among members of the
perpetrator and victim populations. I end by gesturing to the ways in which the account challenges accepted
truths about moral responsibility and its relationship to the reactive attitudes.
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CHAPTER 9 
Citizen Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes: Blaming Americans for War 
Crimes in Iraq 
Amy Sepinwall 
 
“[I]f today I heard that some American had committed suicide rather than live in 
disgrace, I would fully understand….” 
   -- J.M. Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year1 
  
Introduction 
It is now horrifyingly apparent that American prosecution of the war in Iraq, and its 
attendant detention policies, have been rife with abuses. American soldiers killed Iraqi 
civilians by throwing them into the Tigris,2 or shooting them in “massacres” at Haditha 
                                                
1 J.M. Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year (New York: Penguin, 2007), 43 (reflecting on American shame in the 
face of human rughts abuses committed in the course of the war in Iraq.). In a probing critique of this 
passage, Jeff McMahan argues that “even if there are institutional connections between ordinary Americans 
and their government that make it rational for them to feel personal shame over its deeds, to suggest that it 
might be desirable, meritorious, noble, or even morally necessary for them to kill themselves is to attribute 
vastly disproportionate significance to the grounds for shame.” Jeff McMahan, “Torture and Collective 
Shame,” in Anton Leist and Peter Singer, eds., J.M. Coetzee and Ethics: Philosophical Perspectives on 
Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). Earlier in his essay, McMahan roundly rejects 
the notion that the generic American might bear any guilt for the torture of Iraqis. Operating with an 
unfailingly individualist conception of responsibility, McMahan contends that where he neither participated 
in torture nor failed to prevent torture that it was in his power to prevent, he cannot be said to bear 
individual guilt for torture perpetrated by his government. The most that can be ascribed to the generic 
American is, for McMahan, a kind of moral taint by association. It is for this reason that suicide seems to 
McMahan so grossly disproportionate – a product of megalomania or else an obsessive need for moral 
purity. In contrast to McMahan, this essay takes seriously the notion that Americans are individually 
blameworthy for tortyre, and other human rights abuses, committed in the course of the war in Iraq. 
Nothing in this essay should be taken to endorse suicide as an appropriate response to America’s 
transgressions, but the arguments advanced herein should nonetheless help to make sense of the sentiment 
underlying the epigraph. 
2 Dexter Filkins, “The Fall of the Warrior King,” New York Times, October 23, 2005. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2514466 
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and Mahmoudiya,3 or running them over in supply-carrying convoys intent on moving 
through traffic.4 During raids, it became “very common” to shoot the family dog in front 
of the family who owned it, and routine to “destroy” the family’s property with no 
subsequent compensation.5 Detainees died after having been exposed to extreme 
temperatures,6 or subjected to stress positions;7 in one case, an Iraqi prisoner suffered a 
lethal heart attack after he was forced to do long sessions of jumping jacks with a 
sandbag over his head.8  
Cries of ignorance, perhaps once possible, are now unavailable and unavailing. 
The pictorial evidence has been too graphic, the pleas for judicial relief too numerous, 
and the revelations by journalists and veterans too widespread and wrenching, for 
Americans to invoke the Bush Administration’s penchant for secrets and deceit (and 
sometimes that of the Obama Administration as well) as sources of immunity.9 The 
question of responsibility therefore presses upon us: What responsibility do Americans 
bear for these war crimes?10  
                                                
3 Tim McGirk, “Collateral Damage or Civilian Massacre in Haditha?,” Time, March 19, 2007; Richard 
Engel, War Journal: My Five Years in Iraq (New York, Simon and Schuster, 2008), 279. 
4 Chris Hedges and Laila Al-Arian, “The Other War: Iraq Vets Bear Witness,” The Nation, July 30, 2007. 
5 Id. 
6 Glenn Greenwald, “Senate Report Links Bush to Detainee Homicides,” Salon, December 15, 2008. 
7 Seth Hettena, Iraqi Died While Hung From Wrists, AP, February 17, 2005. 
8 Greenwald, supra note 6. 
9 For examples of statements issued by the Bush Administration intended to deny its role in these abuses, 
see, for instance, Dan Froomkin, “Pack of Liars,” Washingtonpost.com, Dec. 12, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/2008/12/12/BL2008121201873.html. The Obama 
Administration has at times upheld the Bush position. For example, the Obama Administration followed 
the Bush strategy of invoking the state secrets defense in order to thwart an ACLU lawsuit challenging the 
U.S. program of rendition, under which alleged terrorists were abducted and sent to other countries to be 
tortured. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, “Obama Fails His First Test on Civil Liberties and Accountability -- 
Resoundingly and Disgracefully,” Salon, Feb. 9, 2009, 
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2009/02/09/state_secrets; David Luban, “You Cover 
It Up, You Own It,” Balkinization, Feb. 10, 2009, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/02/you-cover-it-up-you-
own-it.html.  
10 My use of the term “war crimes” is not intended to be polemical. A Spanish prosecutor, for example, 
recently filed a complaint seeking an indictment against six high-level Bush officials for the torture of 
detainees as a war crime. A copy of the complaint can be found here: 
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For most commentators and scholars, the answer is “none,” at least if we are 
referring to the responsibility of Americans who did not directly participate in the crimes 
in question. Instead, the tendency is one of deflection (onto, for example, George W. 
Bush),11 or submersion (by the Administration of Barack Obama, which implores the 
American public to move forward).12  
These responses find support in a conception of responsibility familiar to us from 
criminal law, in which individual causal responsibility is seen to be the sine qua non of 
culpability.13 Yet, as a handful of scholars have recently argued, the collective nature of 
crimes of war escapes the bounds of the individualist paradigm of Western criminal 
law.14 Thus Mark Drumbl forcefully argues in this collection that “[t]he collective nature 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.publico.es/resources/archivos/2009/3/27/1238184153397QUERELLA_VERSION_FINAL.pdf. 
See generally Jeremy Brecher, Jill Cutler and Brendan Smith, eds., In the Name of Democracy: American 
War Crimes in Iraq and Beyond (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005). Cf. Neta C. Crawford, 
“Individual and Collective Moral Responsibility for Systemic Military Atrocity,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 15 (2007): 187 (arguing that the killing of Iraqi civilians by American soldiers at Haditha and 
Ramadi constitute “systemic atrocities,” – i.e., those that are unintended but foreseeable, resulting from the 
constraints of a larger social structure rather than any individual’s intentional act). 
11 See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, “Dear President Bush,” The Atlantic, October, 2009, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200910/bush-torture/1. 
12 See, e.g., Shailagh Murray, “A Commission on Enhanced Interrogation? Obama Rebuffs Idea,” 
Washington Post, April 23, 2009, 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/04/23/a_commission_on_enhanced_inter.html. 
13 For a statement embracing the principle of individual culpability in international law, see the Appeals’ 
decision in Prosecutor v. Tadic, before the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY): “The 
basic assumption must be that in international law as much as in national systems, the foundation of 
criminal responsibility is the principle of personal culpability: nobody may be held criminally responsible 
for acts or transactions in which he has not personally engaged or in some other way participated (nulla 
poena sine culpa).” Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Appeal Judgment, July 15, 1999), at ¶ 186 (footnotes omitted). Resistance to accomplice liability in 
domestic law is a prominent place exhibiting reverence for the principle of individual culpability as, for 
example, in Joshua Dressler, “Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New 
Solutions to an Old Problem,” Hastings Law Journal 37 (1985): 91-140. 
14 See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, “Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass 
Atrocity,” Northwestern Law Review 99 (2005): 542 (“The dominant discourse determines accountability 
through third-party trial adjudication premised on liberalism's construction of the individual as the central 
unit of action.  This means that a number of selected guilty individuals squarely are to be blamed for 
systemic levels of violence.”) (footnote omitted); George P. Fletcher, “The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and 
Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt,” Yale Law Journal 111 (2002): 1499-1573. Cf. Larry 
May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account (New York: Cambridge, 2005), 246-49 (advocating 
collective responsibility as a supplement to individual responsibility in “situations of group-based harm, 
[where] many members of the society may have chosen to play a role in the climate that has been 
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of [atrocity] sits uncomfortably with international criminal law’s predicate of individual 
agency, action, and authorship.”15  Similarly, George Fletcher contends that “the liberal 
bias toward individual criminal responsibility obscures basic truths about the crimes that 
now constitute the core of international criminal law. The[se] crimes … are deeds that by 
their very nature are committed by groups and typically against individuals as members 
of groups.”16 
One might have thought that dissatisfaction with the conception of responsibility 
underpinning the response to atrocity would have occasioned support for the notion of 
collective guilt. But the alternatives proposed by critics like Fletcher and Drumbl are far 
more modest. Fletcher’s interest in collective guilt is intended not to implicate those who 
acquiesced in atrocity but instead to mitigate the responsibility of those who committed 
it.17 Drumbl is prepared to countenance group-based responsibility, but only if individual 
group members are permitted “the subsequent opportunity … to affirmatively 
demonstrate why they should be excluded from the liable group.”18 Accordingly, on 
Drumbl’s account, group members who resisted or spoke out against mass atrocity would 
be exempt from having to contribute to a collective sanction levied against other 
members of the group.19 Similarly, others who have entertained the notion of collective 
                                                                                                                                            
instrumental in nurturing the harmful conduct.”); Larry May, War Crimes and Just War (New York: 
Cambridge, 2007), 247-56 (offering a qualified defense of joint criminal enterprise as a kind of collective 
responsibility where the responsibility of each member turns on his having an intention to participate in the 
collective injury).  
15 Mark Drumbl, Collective Responsibility and Post-Conflict Justice, at 1. See also Mark A. Drumbl, 
Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (New York: Cambridge, 2007): 37 (“[i]nternational criminal 
culpability is too crude a device to assimilate and measure the small things many people do that make the 
larger things fewer people do truly pandemic.”). 
16 Fletcher, supra note 14 at 1513. 
17 Fletcher, supra note 14 at 1541-42. 
18 Mark Drumbl, Collective Responsibility and Post-Conflict Justice, supra note 15 at 25. 
19 Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law, supra note 15 at 208. Drumbl worries that an 
assessment that ignores individual culpability will entail not only that the debtor class will include 
“innocent” group members, but also that the beneficiary class will include complicit group members. Such 
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sanctions in this context contemplate internal rights of contribution, which would allow 
the group to apportion group-based sanctions according to members’ relative amounts of 
wrongdoing.20 In short, those who call for a more encompassing understanding of 
responsibility for atrocity have nonetheless remained faithful to the principle of 
individual culpability embodied in international criminal law. 
By contrast, this paper takes seriously the notion that individuals may bear 
responsibility for the transgressions of their group even where they do not bear the 
hallmarks of individual culpability. More specifically, I shall contend that citizenship 
itself can ground responsibility for the crimes of one’s nation-state. To be clear, my 
interest here lies not in uncovering when and why it is appropriate to hold groups 
responsible (whether conceived as nations or states), questions addressed by the papers 
by Toni Erskine and Tony Lang in this volume; nor am I interested in determining the 
circumstances when, and grounds upon which, it is appropriate to transmit sanctions 
imposed upon the group to its members, which is the question Richard Vernon and Avia 
Pasternak confront in their contributions. I am interested instead in locating and 
interrogating the grounds upon which we may, in the first instance, hold group members 
responsible for a transgression of their group. The focus here is then on responsibility 
assigned directly to members, and not derivative of the responsibility of the group. 
                                                                                                                                            
an assessment “would restitute some individuals while unjustly enriching others.” Id. at 200. While I go on 
to defend an assignment of responsibility that Drumbl deems “crude”, I see no reason why this assignment 
could not function alongside a careful delineation of the individuals entitled to compensation. 
20 See, e.g., Mark Osiel, “The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity,” Columbia 
Law Review 105 (2005): 1842-59 (advocating the imposition of collective civil sanctions on military units, 
and arguing that these are just because they allow military officers to redistribute the sanction internally so 
that it is levied in accordance with individual guilt). Cf. Daryl Levinson, “Collective Sanctions,” Stanford 
Law Review 56 (2003): 345-428 (advocating collective sanctions within criminal law, but anticipating that 
the sanctions will work themselves out internally, to cohere with principles of individual culpability). 
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Moreover, the kind of responsibility I have in mind is not simply the forward-
looking variety, which is what many forms of civil liability and reparations programs 
contemplate; nor is it simply outcome responsibility, which arises where an individual 
deserves to incur the material consequences of her acts, but not moral sanction.21 Instead, 
I shall argue that U.S. citizens are legitimate targets of blame for abuses committed in the 
course of the war in Iraq.22 
The account of citizen responsibility that I advance differs from the individualist 
account insofar as it severs moral and causal responsibility: Again, I shall argue that the 
citizen may bear moral responsibility even though she did not participate in, facilitate, or 
even tolerate the abuses committed in her midst. The account also severs the notions of 
guilt and blameworthiness: I shall argue that the citizen may be an appropriate object of 
blame (and hence appropriately subject to resentment and indignation) even though she 
need not conceive of herself as guilty. And I shall suggest that this fracturing of the 
traditional troika of guilt, resentment, and indignation has implications for the way we 
think about moral responsibility more generally.  
                                                
21 See, e.g., David Miller, “Holding Nations Responsible,” Ethics 114 (January 2004): 244-46; Richard 
Vernon, Punishing Collectives: States or Nations at 14. 
22 Most accounts that seek to assign responsibility to group members who did not participate in the group 
transgression contemplate forward-looking responsibility, and not responsibility as an assignment of blame. 
For example, John Parrish has sought to argue that Americans bear responsibility for illegal killings and 
other injuries suffered by Iraqi civilians. Though Parrish assigns responsibility to Americans independent 
of individual blameworthiness, he understands responsibility to consist of an obligation of repair, and not as 
liability to blame. John M. Parrish, “Collective Responsibility and the State,” International Theory 1 
(2009): 119- 154. Similarly, in other contexts, theorists have argued that citizens may be held responsible to 
redress harms of their nation-state, though these citizens are innocent of wrongdoing. See, e.g., Debra Satz, 
“What Do We Owe the Global Poor?,” Ethics and International Affairs 19 (2005): 47-54.  
Juha Raikka is one who has argued that even those who dissociate themselves from their group’s 
wrongdoing may nonetheless warrant blame for that wrongdoing. Juha Raikka, “On Disassociating Oneself 
from Collective Responsibility,” Social Theory and Practice 23 (1997): 93-108. In brief, Raikka argues that 
dissidents come to bear responsibility for group acts that they oppose where they must participate in, or 
otherwise support, an evil practice in order to oppose that same or another evil practice. Raikka’s account is 
not as far-reaching as my own, and it is particularly unhelpful here, since it is far from clear that the 
American opponent of the war in Iraq need participate in any evil practice in order to voice her opposition. 
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 I begin by articulating an account of the relationship between the citizen and her 
nation-state that grounds the citizen’s responsibility for a transgression of her nation-state 
independent of the extent of her participation in that transgression. I do not anticipate, 
however, that that account will induce guilt in every American who encounters it. The 
resistance to guilt is itself interesting and, in the second Part of the paper, I seek to 
investigate its source. To that end, I undertake an exploration of the moral psychology of 
guilt and resentment, especially as these emotions pertain to understandings of 
responsibility for war crimes among members of the perpetrator and victim populations. I 
end by gesturing to the ways in which the account challenges accepted truths about moral 
responsibility and its relationship to the reactive attitudes. 
Some words about terminology first: By “morally responsible,” I shall mean 
“appropriately subject to blame,” which I take to mean the same thing as “blameworthy.” 
Further, I conceive of the experience of guilt as being constituted, at least in part, by the 
judgment that one has breached an expectation whose authority one recognizes.23 
Whether that experience is also constituted by guilt feelings is a question I shall have 
occasion to consider in what follows. For now, it is sufficient to note that by “guilt 
feelings” I shall mean the phenomenological correlates of the judgment involved in 
                                                
23 Cf. Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 85 (“To feel guilty, [an individual] must accept not only that he has done 
something which is forbidden, he must accept also that it is forbidden, and thereby accept the authority of 
whoever or whatever forbids it.”). Though Taylor here speaks of “feel[ing] guilt,” she clearly has the 
cognitive component of guilt in mind and so her description fits what I have referred to as the judgment 
involved in the experience of guilt.  
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experiencing guilt – typically, pain, sadness, etc.24 Finally, I refer to the entity whose acts 
occasion responsibility as the “nation-state.”25  
  
I. Citizen Responsibility 
The notion that one may be held morally responsible for a group wrong not in virtue of 
one’s participation in it but instead in virtue of group membership alone has been termed 
“tribal,”26 and even “barbarous.”27  Indeed, those who seek to blame Americans for 
abuses committed in the war in Iraq have been accused of succumbing to the same kind 
of spurious logic that allowed the 9/11 terrorists to kill American civilians in retaliation 
for (purported) grievances against the American government.28 But what these critics fail 
to see (and what the 9/11 terrorists, tragically, failed to see) is that assignments of 
responsibility need not be one-size-fits-all. Instead, we may hold different people 
responsible to different degrees for the same event or state of affairs, which may lead to 
our imposing upon them different kinds or amounts of sanction. It is worth beginning our 
                                                
24 See, e.g., Margaret Gilbert, “Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings,” Journal of Ethics 6 (2002): 
118-119. 
25 In his contribution to this volume, Richard Vernon offers an incisive inquiry into whether the responsible 
collective ought to be understood as the state or the nation, and Vernon settles on the former. Vernon 
persuasively argues that the transmission of liability from a socio-political entity to its members can be 
defended for states, but not for nations, since it is the open-ended delegation of authority to the state that 
legitimates our imposing upon citizens the consequences of that delegation (here, the sanctions arising in 
the aftermath of state crime), and this open-ended delegation of authority is an essential feature of the state, 
but not the nation. All of this seems correct if one is concerned with citizens’ derivative liability, as Vernon 
is. But I am concerned with citizens’ individual moral responsibility. For my purposes, something more 
normatively robust than the mere state is required. More specifically, the collective entity in question must 
possess the political character of a state since, as Vernon rightly notes, it is in its political aspect that the 
collectivity commits crimes of war. But mere states, we shall see, need not encompass the normative 
obligations of fidelity to fellow members and the group itself that ground responsibility here. For these 
reasons, I invoke the nation-state as the collective actor of interest. 
26 See, e.g., Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meaning of Apologies (New York: Cambridge, 2008): 188. 
27 See, e.g., H.D. Lewis, “The Non-Moral Notion of Collective Responsibility,” in Individual and 
Collective Responsibility: The Massacre at My Lai, ed. Peter A. French (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman 
Publishing Company, 1972): 121.  
28 See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 10 at 205.  
 9 
inquiry into citizens’ responsibility by considering two factors that govern the magnitude 
of a responsibility assignment. 
First, and most obviously, responsibility turns on the nature of the injury in 
question, which we may call the object of responsibility. Thus, the murderer is more 
blameworthy, ceteris paribus, than is the assailant whose victim sustains only non-lethal 
injuries. Second, the magnitude of a responsibility assignment varies according to the 
nature of the individual’s relationship to the injury for which we seek to assign 
responsibility. Thus, for example, Kitty Genovese’s assailant bears more responsibility 
for her death than do the residents of Kew Gardens; the former intends her death, while 
the latter recklessly refuse her rescue, and thereby contribute to her death.29 We may refer 
to this second factor as the ground of responsibility.  
Now, the claim to be defended in this Part is that all Americans of majority age 
bear responsibility for American transgressions – that is, the object of responsibility is the 
same for all. But it is worth noting up front that the ground of responsibility will differ in 
accordance with the nature of the relationship of each American to the transgression in 
question. In particular, perpetrators, bystanders and opponents of the transgression each 
bear a different relationship to it, and these differences entail differences in the magnitude 
of responsibility to be assigned to members of each camp. 
To take one example: The complacent bystander (but not the dissident) has done 
nothing to diminish the perpetrator’s motivation to commit the atrocity in question. The 
complacent bystander thereby signals to the perpetrator (as well, as his victim, perhaps) 
                                                
29 The standard account of the Kitty Genovese case has recently been disputed. See Rachel Manning, Mark 
Levine & Alan Collins, “The Kitty Genovese Murder and the Social Psychology of Helping:  The Parable 
of the 38 Witnesses,” American Psychologist 62 (2007): 555. I nonetheless employ the standard account 
here for illustrative purposes. 
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that the victim’s treatment does not merit opposition. In this way, he helps to normalize 
this treatment. So the ground of the complacent bystander’s responsibility, but not that of 
the dissident, includes the support through silence that complacency confers. The 
complacent bystander will thus come to bear more responsibility than will the dissident.30 
More generally, it cannot be denied that the perpetrators and facilitators of 
atrocity are related to the atrocity in ways that the dissident, and other non-participants, 
are not. But there is one way in which all adult citizens are related to the atrocity, and it is 
this relationship upon which I focus here.  
Each citizen bears a commitment to the nation-state, and this commitment, as I 
argue at greater length elsewhere,31 provides a ground for holding each citizen 
responsible for the nation-state’s acts, no matter the extent of her participation or 
opposition. More specifically, the citizen’s commitment to the nation-state contains a 
normative dimension that requires the citizen to accept responsibility for her nation-
state’s transgressions. 
To get a better handle on the normative dimension of commitment, it will be 
useful first to contemplate other, more intimate contexts of commitment. Consider the 
marital union, for example. Individuals in a marriage must act with a certain regard for 
                                                
30 To be sure, there may be many complacent bystanders – so many that the causal role of any one of them 
may be insignificant. But moral responsibility is not a zero-sum matter, with the portion of responsibility 
for each individual turning on the number of people sharing it. For one thing, that complacency is rampant 
is a matter of moral luck. The complacent bystander should not be treated more leniently, then, just because 
others join him in providing psychic support to the atrocity’s perpetrators. Indeed, we might say something 
even stronger than this: Each of these bystanders reinforces the complacency of the other, and thereby 
comes to bear responsibility not only for the atrocity the complacency supports but also the complacency 
itself. Cf. Larry May, Sharing Responsibility (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 47 (arguing 
that those who hold racist attitudes “causally contribut[e] to a climate that influences others to cause 
harm.”). 
31 Amy Sepinwall, “Responsibility for Group Transgressions,” Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 2010. 
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their union.32 While exit is a real option, each nonetheless bears an obligation to the other 
to put the possibility of exit out of his or her mind, at least while less disruptive options 
exist. And, each is obligated to the other to present a united front to the world, for 
maligning one’s spouse to others would degrade the union and violate marital trust. 
Similarly, individuals in a joint business partnership must each also operate with a 
certain regard for the joint venture, and commit themselves to working out the kinks of 
the operation before contemplating dissolution. And, where one partner is empowered to, 
say, manage the partnership’s business, the other partner may not publicly disparage the 
result, and disavow responsibility for it. To do so would be to make a fool of the 
producing partner, and to exhibit a reproachable lack of loyalty.  
Now, we should note that the strength of the obligations each member of the joint 
venture bears to the other(s) will depend on the strength of the commitment the joint 
venture expects of its members. Thus spouses typically have greater obligations of 
fidelity to each other than do business partners since a marriage typically demands more 
of the individuals comprising it than does a business venture. Nonetheless, some amount 
of fidelity follows from membership in the partnership just as it does in the marital union. 
Mutatis mutandis, I shall now argue, some amount of fidelity follows from membership 
in the joint project that is the United States. By way of establishing this point, I offer first 
some general remarks about the ways in which citizenship can entail a commitment of the 
kind that grounds responsibility. I then describe the ways in which America might be 
understood as a joint project.  
                                                
32 Cf. Herbert Morris, On Guilt and Innocence: Essays in Legal Philosophy and Moral Psychology 
(Berkeley : University of California Press, 1976), 124-125 (arguing that a husband’s intention to commit 
adultery, even if never acted upon, constitutes a betrayal of his spouse because marriage “is defined partly 
by each partner being prepared to exercise restraint out of love and respect for the other. The man’s 
intention reveals that he is no longer prepared to abide by this condition.”).  
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The citizen harbors a commitment to the nation-state and that commitment 
obligates him in special ways to his fellow citizens. The citizen has an obligation (though 
not an insuperable one) to operate with a certain regard for the ways in which his acts 
reflect on or contribute to the nation-state. He must demonstrate a loyalty that requires, 
among other things, that he seek to change his country’s conduct or policies before 
jumping ship, as it were. Most relevant here, his commitment entails that he may not step 
outside the nation-state to point a finger in righteous indignation at his state’s 
transgressions; instead, he must stand in judgment with his fellow citizens, in recognition 
that the nation-state is his as well as theirs. To do otherwise is to denigrate the shared 
venture; it is to demonstrate a solipsism incompatible with citizenship.33 
Importantly, the commitment that grounds the citizen’s responsibility is a 
normative component of citizenship. This commitment may well have attendant 
psychological effects – in particular, it may be accompanied by a feeling of loyalty 
toward one’s fellow citizens and the nation-state itself, a feeling of pride at their or the 
nation-state’s successes, or a feeling of shame in the face of their or its misdeeds. Indeed, 
the commitment entails a normative expectation that the citizen will experience just these 
feelings in the appropriate contexts. But the psychological concomitants of the citizen’s 
commitment are not themselves the ground of his responsibility.34 If they were, a citizen 
                                                
33 Since, on at least some accounts, responsibility presupposes freedom, I will note here that the account of 
citizen responsibility I advance depends upon a genuine right of exit and, as such, applies only where each 
citizen can emigrate and is not unduly deprived by the state of the resources necessary to do so. I take it 
that it is relatively uncontroversial to presuppose that Americans possess genuine rights of exit.  
34 But see Farid Abdel-Nour, “National Responsibility,” Political Theory 31 (2003): 703 (contending that 
citizens’ national responsibility “only extends to the actions that have historically brought about the objects 
of their national pride.”) (italics in original); Meir Dan-Cohen, “Responsibility and the Boundaries of the 
Self,” Harvard Law Review 105 (1992): 9591003. Both Abdel-Nour and Dan-Cohen argue that citizens can 
share responsibility for the nation-state’s acts in virtue of actual feelings of national identification – in 
particular, acts that elicit pride or shame on the part of the citizen. The problem with these accounts is that 
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could deny responsibility simply by disclaiming any psychological attachment to the 
nation-state. Instead, the disaffected citizen bears an amount of responsibility for the 
nation-state’s transgressions that corresponds to the strength of the commitment 
citizenship entails, regardless of whether the citizen has fulfilled her commitment by 
harboring the feelings of loyalty that the commitment demands. 
That citizenship has the normative cast invoked here is a contingent, and not a 
conceptual, matter; citizenship need not function in this way everywhere and at all times. 
For example, loose political associations in which citizenship is a shorthand for eligibility 
for a set of legal entitlements and obligations, with no attendant sense that citizens are 
joined in a shared project, would not sustain the normative component of citizenship that 
grounds responsibility here. Citizenship in some of the states of the United States might 
well be of this kind. Similarly, individuals who have been granted formal citizenship but 
are denied inclusion in the joint project of the nation-state would not be subject to the 
normative pressures that ground responsibility. Think here of Blacks in the Jim Crow 
south, or Jews in the early years of the Nazi regime, who enjoyed formal citizenship but 
nonetheless experienced significant political disempowerment. The account advanced 
here would not extend to these excluded citizens either.  
Nonetheless, there is good reason to think that American citizenship is more than 
sufficiently robust to comprehend the normative elements – in particular, the demand that 
citizens stand together in judgment -- that, I have argued, ground the citizen’s 
responsibility. There are multiple ways in which one could draw out the normative 
project of the United States. For our purposes, it will suffice to focus on the quasi-
                                                                                                                                            
they risk exculpating disaffected or alienated citizens, and perhaps threaten unwarrantedly to implicate 
outsiders who identify with the country in question. 
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spiritual understanding of the nation’s mission, and the connection to martyrdom that this 
understanding yields.  
At the time of the nation’s founding, Americans conceived of themselves as a 
chosen people,35 and their purpose as a kind of “errand into the wilderness.”36 The image 
of America as “a city on a hill” – a phrase borrowed from Jesus’s Sermon on the Mount – 
figures in a continuous stream of political speeches, from the earliest Puritan settlers to 
modern-day political figures as diverse as John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan, with 
riffs on the phrase provided by, among others, George H. W. Bush (“a thousand points of 
light”), Wesley Clarke (“a beacon of hope and a source of inspiration for people 
everywhere”), and John Kerry (“we have moved closer to the America we can become – 
for our own people, for the country, and for the world.”).37 In the wake of the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, commentators and politicians alike have embraced America’s 
“imperial mission” of delivering the canons of American ideology to the world at large,38 
a mission toward which “God is not neutral,” as former President George W. Bush 
intoned to the American people.39  
Religious elements pervade the conception of American citizenship, seen most 
readily, perhaps, in the steps required of foreigners who wish to become U.S. citizens. 
                                                
35 See Rogers M. Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership (New 
York: Cambridge, 2003), 7.  
36 E.g., Kenneth Karst, Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1989), 30. 
37 See generally Kimberly Winston, “From Theological Tenet to Political Password: Three of the 
Democratic Candidates Have Already Pitched to Their Audiences Some Version of the ‘City on a Hill’ 
Speech.” Beliefnet, http://www.beliefnet.com/News/Politics/2004/02/From-Theological-Tenet-To-Political-
Password.aspx (last visited March 1, 2010). 
38 Fouad Ajami, “Hail the American Imperium,” U.S. News and World Reports, November 5, 2002, 28. See 
also W.J. Bennett, Why We Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism (New York: Doubleday, 2002); 
Walter Berns, Making Patriots (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), Dinesh D’Souza, What’s So 
Great About America (Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2002). See generally Smith, supra note 35 at 191-210. 
39 George W. Bush, “After September 11,” (Speech to Congress, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2001), 
http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/gw-bush-9-11.htm. 
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The process of Americanization, as the 1997 Jordan Report on naturalization stated, 
should “cultivate” immigrants in a “shared commitment to the American values of 
liberty, democracy and equal opportunity.”40  Peter Spiro, a noted theorist of citizenship, 
contends that this recommendation makes “America look[] more like a religion, allowing 
for conversion of belief in the place of any need of lineage.”41  
If the nation was founded in a higher calling, it makes sense that its citizens 
should be willing to die for its sake, or so political theorists have argued. The original 
delineation of American citizenship – who was in and who was out – was itself 
determined with an eye to national security. Membership in the early years of the nation 
would be conferred to any White person born in the United States as a way of 
“guarantee[ing] … the manpower for the nation’s defense.”42 And, today, military service 
is the quickest and surest route to naturalization for those not born here: “In times of 
peace, one year’s honorable service in the U.S. armed forces qualifies an alien for 
naturalization; during periods of military hostilities, including now the post 9/11 period, 
an alien becomes eligible on enlistment….”43  
Moreover, the connection between military service and citizenship is not just 
pragmatic. As Paul Kahn argues, for example, the prospect of self-sacrifice is 
foundational in the American political culture, both in the sense that the United States 
was born in revolution, and that the United States is sustained by the government’s 
continued authority to demand that Americans kill or be killed on its behalf.44  To make 
                                                
40 Peter Spiro, Beyond Citizenship: American Identity after Globalization (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 47 (italics added). 
41 Id. at 47. 
42 Id. at 15. 
43 Id. at 38. 
44 Paul W. Kahn, Sacred Violence: Torture, Terror and Sovereignty (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2008). While I am foregrounding military service as the central obligation of citizenship, it may be 
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his point, Kahn invites us to consider the naturalization oath of allegiance, which, in 
requiring the individual seeking American citizenship to pledge that she will “bear arms 
on behalf of the United States when required by law to do so,” conveys, Kahn notes, the 
“sovereign demand on citizenship as an open-ended willingness to sacrifice.”45 And it is 
not just for immigrants-cum-citizens that the obligation to die for America is made 
salient; other theorists have noted that, among the duties that all American citizens bear, 
“[a]bove all others is the duty to bear arms and to face the mortal hazards of the 
battlefield.”46 Yet the prerogative of the sovereign to demand its citizens’ deaths likely 
only makes sense within a nation-state that claims a commitment of its citizens of the 
kind at issue here.47 The notion that Americans should be willing to kill and die for 
America is, then, a strong piece of evidence in support of the claim that American 
citizenship has a normative cast. 
                                                                                                                                            
worth noting that jury duty is also indicative of the normative commitment American citizens bear. So 
important a civic service is jury duty that, in some jurisdictions, sheriffs are empowered to seize individuals 
eligible to sit on a jury and deliver them to court, where the court finds that it does not have enough people 
present to empanel a jury, see, e.g., California Code of Civil Procedure Section 211 – a process viewed as 
kidnapping, by some lights.  
 Peter Spiro, whose general project is to argue that territorially defined citizenship no longer tracks 
the affective ties upon which citizenship should be grounded, contends that today it makes little sense to 
restrict jury service to citizens: “[I]f one takes seriously the proposition that criminal defendants are entitled 
to a jury of their peers, the practice [of excluding resident aliens] looks more like a deprivation of a right 
rather than an exemption from a duty.” Spiro, supra note 40 at 99. Against Spiro’s critique, one might argue 
that eligibility for jury duty is not about whether the prospective juror counts as a “peer” but instead 
whether she is entitled to stand in judgment – an understanding of the obligation more congenial to the 
conception of citizenship I advance. On that conception, I would argue, citizens are specially placed to hold 
one another to the laws to which both should be committed, and that both should affirm. 
45 Kahn, supra note 44 at 98. 
46 Spiro, supra note 40 at 97. See generally George Kateb, Patriotism and Other Mistakes (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2006), 7 (“How is patriotism most importantly shown? Let us not mince words. The 
answer is that it is most importantly shown in a readiness, whether reluctant or matter of fact, social or 
zealous, to die and to kill for one’s country.”).   
47 In this volume, David Luban offers a critique of the state cast as jealous god, demanding its citizens’ 
lives when its own existence is threatened, and fighting wars against other states with near impunity. While 
I find his critique compelling, my purpose here is simply to describe, and not evaluate, the cultural 
phenomenon in question. 
 17 
To be sure, the prospect of being called to the battlefield is remote for most 
Americans. Nonetheless, there are moments in Americans’ lives – moments of 
“extraordinary politics,” as Bruce Ackerman refers to them – when Americans are called 
upon to transcend the pursuit of self-interest in deference to the needs of the country or 
their compatriots.48 This transcendence may be less difficult for Americans than others to 
effect, given that Americans rank higher than any other people on patriotic sentiment.49 
And even those who disagree with U.S. policies can, with the right cast of mind and 
heart, nonetheless wear the banner of patriotism. For the practice of dissent, far from 
being taken to rend the fabric of national unity, is reckoned as a paradigmatically 
American form of enacting one’s citizenship, and construed as part of the project of 
national stewardship.50 
In general, the obligation to act with an eye toward the national interest – whether 
in times of war or peace -- is, in America, a national trope, figuring in presidential 
addresses (“Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your 
country”) and patriotic slogans (“I only regret that I have but one life to give my 
country”). Briefly put, it is hard to imagine an America where commitment to the nation-
                                                
48 See Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1993). 
49 See, e.g., Jack Citrin, “Political Culture,” in Understanding America: The Anatomy of an Exceptional 
Nation, Peter Schuck and James Q. Wilson, eds. (New York, NY: Public Affairs Press, 2009): 154. 
50 Consider, for example, Justice Brandeis’s stirring defense of the right to dissent in his concurrence in 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), a case challenging the defendant’s conviction for her 
membership in the Communist Labor Party: “Those who won our independence believed … that the 
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should 
be a fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized … that the path of safety lies in 
the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies. … Recognizing the 
occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and 
assembly should be guaranteed.” Id. at 375 (footnote omitted). Cf. Andrew Mason, “Special Obligations to 
Compatriots,” Ethics 107 (April 1997): 444. (“The idea that we have a special obligation to our compatriots 
to participate fully in public life has been thought to include or entail various specific obligations, such as 
an obligation … to keep a watchful eye on government and speak out when it acts unjustly.”) 
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state is not a feature of the citizen’s identity that sits comfortably alongside, and 
sometimes even transcends, other sources of affinity.51   
The foregoing provides insight into not only the generic American’s responsibility 
for abuses in Iraq but that of the American opponent of the war as well, for the dissident 
also harbors a commitment to the nation-state. Indeed, it is in virtue of this commitment 
that the dissident enacts her opposition: She believes that the pursuit and conduct of the 
war in Iraq grossly betray values she takes to be fundamental and sacred to her beloved 
country, and her opposition is intended to restore America to its rightful path (or her 
conception of it, anyway). Were she not so committed to the United States, she might 
well have sought to leave it. Having stayed, however, she must accept that its acts 
redound to her. Just as the non-producing business partner may not disown the products 
of his partnership so the dissident may not disown the acts of the United States.52 
In short, the commitment inherent in American citizenship grounds the 
American’s responsibility for the United States’ acts, and the expected strength of that 
commitment determines the magnitude of responsibility she bears through citizenship 
alone.53 Four qualifications round out this part of the account. First, given that 
                                                
51 Cf. Citrin, supra note 49. 
52 Richard Vernon argues, in his contribution, that the mere fact that a citizen supports the project of the 
nation-state need not entail that she bears responsibility for any acts undertaken in furtherance of that 
project. In particular, where the citizen valiantly opposes the acts in question, Vernon contends, her 
opposition ought to thwart an attempt to hold her responsible. After all, to will the end is not to will the 
means, Vernon pithily reminds us. To be clear, then, the ground of responsibility on my account is different 
from the one that Vernon critiques. For one thing, the dissident would come to bear responsibility for a 
national wrong on my account even if the wrong proved ineffective at protecting or promoting the nation-
state. More generally, the dissident’s commitment need bear no relationship – teleological, motivational, or 
otherwise -- to the misdeed of her compatriots in order for her to merit responsibility for that misdeed. 
Instead, the ground of the dissident’s responsibility follows from an obligation of fidelity that she owes her 
fellow citizens in virtue of their shared membership in the larger enterprise of the nation-state. 
53 In this volume, Avia Pasternak advances an account of citizenship as an associative obligation that 
resonates well with the conception of citizenship articulated here. Nonetheless, I do not agree with 
Pasternak that her account can justify an equal distribution (ED) of burdens among citizens. Instead, it 
seems to me that the “solidary” nature of citizenship would be disrupted if each citizen were to carry an 
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commitment to the nation-state licenses our holding citizens responsible, it is expected 
only of those individuals who qualify as moral agents. The agency requirement follows 
from the conditions under which it would be permissible to hold an individual 
responsible for her own acts. Citizens who do not satisfy the criteria for individual 
responsibility ought not to bear responsibility derived exclusively from their group 
affiliations.  
Second, I here assume that it is possible to measure the extent of expected or 
actual commitment, but I do not offer a methodology for doing so here, leaving that task 
instead to sociologists and psychologists. Third, I assume further that, in the United 
States, the expected strength of commitment is the same for all citizens who have reached 
the age of majority. Thus, the generic American and the U.S. perpetrator of war crimes in 
Iraq will both bear equal responsibility for these war crimes in light of their citizenship. 
The perpetrator will, in addition to the responsibility she bears qua citizen, bear 
responsibility qua perpetrator. We should then expect the perpetrator’s responsibility to 
be significantly greater than that of the generic American. But there is nonetheless some 
(non-zero) amount of responsibility appropriately assigned to the generic American 
citizen.  
Finally, I do not venture to spell out the nature of the sanctions appropriate to 
generic Americans simply in virtue of their citizenship except to say that I assume that 
                                                                                                                                            
equal burden independent of the extent of his or her participation in the state transgression in question. Far 
from fostering solidarity, an insistence upon an equal distribution in the face of differential contributions to 
the wrong might instead prompt friction between citizens, as those who did not participate in the wrong 
rightfully awaited exoneration – or at least relief from the sharing of burdens – from those who did 
participate. My account, by contrast, seeks to be sensitive to the different kinds of relationships citizens can 
have to a transgression of their nation-state, and to adjust the magnitude of responsibility accordingly. At 
the same time, it views citizenship as an inescapable ground of responsibility, and in that way may well 
honor the good of citizenship that Pasternak helpfully and lucidly identifies, without fomenting the 
resentments to which, I worry, her account may give rise. 
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the magnitude of their responsibility would be too little to warrant individual punishment. 
Instead, responsibility of the kind and magnitude entailed by citizenship is much better 
cashed out in the form of emotional sanctions like resentment and indignation, as we 
shall see in the next Part. (Indeed, it is for this reason that the American who opposes the 
war in Iraq likely chooses dissidence over emigration -- the costs of uprooting oneself 
and renouncing one’s attachment to one’s beloved nation-state are far greater than the 
sanctions to which, I anticipate, citizenship on its own gives rise.) 
Because citizenship grounds the American’s responsibility for U.S. 
transgressions, and because one either is or is not a citizen, Mark Drumbl refers to the 
account just advanced as “crude,”54 and he rejects it in favor of what he terms the “crude-
careful” way, which delineates the responsible group crudely, but allows individual 
members to escape liability where they can demonstrate, for example, that they sought to 
prevent the atrocity in question, or were themselves victims of their state’s crime. But this 
way of putting the difference between our accounts is misleading for citizenship is not, 
on my account, some rough proxy for individual culpability, as it may be on Drumbl’s 
crude-careful account. Citizenship is instead a real basis of individual culpability, though 
the culpability it yields may be overwhelmed by countervailing sources of moral credit, 
which include acts undertaken to oppose the atrocity. Indeed, we shall see in the next Part 
that the citizen’s dissidence can sometimes, though not always, undercut the warrant for 
others’ resentment or indignation. In short, then, it is not clear that my account is any less 
careful than Drumbl’s; it is just that I attach moral weight to citizenship and Drumbl does 
not, so that dissident citizens more readily (though not necessarily more deservedly) 
escape liability on his account than on my own. 
                                                
54 Mark Drumbl, Collective Responsibility and Post-Conflict Justice, at 17. 
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On a related note, Drumbl is correct that my account, focused as it is on American 
wrongdoing in the war in Iraq, does not contemplate situations in which some citizens 
were themselves victimized by the state transgression for which we seek to assign 
responsibility. Here too though it is not clear that relying on citizenship, as my account 
does, produces outcomes that are less just than those of Drumbl’s account. As I have 
argued in a different context,55 requiring formerly oppressed citizens to contribute to 
programs aimed at rectifying past abuses against them affirms their co-equal membership 
in the nation-state. And, the compensation amount can be inflated beyond what is owed 
for the abuses themselves in order to reimburse the formerly oppressed citizens for their 
contributions. In this way, victimized citizens’ contributions come to have a purely 
symbolic function: They reinforce the equality that was denied by the oppression by 
including the victims in the national program of repair, and they do not, in the end, cost 
the victims anything. 
That theorists like Drumbl who appreciate the collective character of atrocity 
nonetheless deny that blameworthiness can arise independent of individual fault should 
give us pause. For it turns out that there are deep psychological currents that make an 
individualist stance difficult to overcome, as we shall now see. 
 
II. Citizen Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes 
I noted at the outset that an American who did not support the war in Iraq might resist the 
idea that she bears responsibility for abuses committed in its course. Even were she to 
encounter the arguments of the last Part, she might nonetheless maintain – with full 
                                                
55 Amy J. Sepinwall, “Responsibility for Historic Injustices: Reconceiving the Case for Reparations,” 
Journal of Law and Politics 22 (2006): 183-229. 
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honesty – that she harbors no guilt over American war crimes committed in Iraq. More 
specifically, the citizen in question might lack the unpleasant sensation of guilt, and she 
might also resist the belief that she has acted wrongly. Her response provides an occasion 
to assess the relationship between bearing guilt, experiencing guilt, and feeling guilt – or, 
put more generally, the relationship between responsibility, the reactive attitudes, and 
their accompanying sensations. 
 I seek to argue here that although our paradigmatic experience of responsibility 
involves the blamed individual’s felt guilt and acknowledgement of wrongdoing, an 
assignment of responsibility may well be warranted even where one or both of these 
pieces are absent. This is not an uncontroversial claim. On some conceptions of 
responsibility, a judgment of responsibility is believed to be constituted by one or more 
reactive attitudes;56 and, on some conceptions of the reactive attitudes, emotions are 
themselves believed to be constituted by feeling-sensations.57 How, then, can we arrive at 
a justified assignment of responsibility where the citizen – when presented with the 
grounds of her responsibility -- neither responds to herself with guilt nor has any kind of 
guilt sensation? Put differently, how can it at once be appropriate for the Iraqi to resent 
the American and the American to forswear remorse? 
 To answer these questions, I begin with the case of the dissident. The dissident 
need not deny that citizenship is a ground of responsibility, as the last Part argues. She 
                                                
56 See, e.g., Gary Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme,” in 
Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, Ferdinand Schoeman, ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 257 (“Strawson’s radical claim is that these ‘reactive 
attitudes’ (as he calls them) are constitutive of moral responsibility; to regard oneself or another as 
responsible just is the proneness to react to them in these kinds of ways under certain conditions.”). 
57 See, e.g., Elisa A. Hurley, “Working Passions: Emotions and Creative Engagement with Value,” 
Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (2007): 83 (“Feelings seem to be somehow essential to what emotions 
are, even if they are not necessarily present on every token occasion of emotion.”); Morris, supra note 32 at 
102 (“When feeling guilty we characteristically suffer pain that is partly constitutive of the feeling.”). 
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may nonetheless maintain that her dissidence functions as a defense. More specifically, 
the dissident may believe that her acts of resistance more than offset her commitment to 
the United States, and so exempt her from responsibility. As such, she does not judge 
herself to have acted wrongly and, accordingly, feels no guilt. In the first Section of this 
Part, I attempt to make sense of her experience of her relationship to U.S. transgressions 
in light of resentment that victims of these transgressions might direct toward her. 
 The generic citizen is situated differently from the dissident. He cannot call upon 
a set of activities that purportedly tempers or eliminates his responsibility in order to 
explain his self-asserted innocence. Instead, he invokes the absence of guilt feelings – his 
own, as well as those of most of his compatriots -- as a defense in itself: “Were we who 
didn’t participate morally responsible,” this imagined citizen might argue, “at least many 
of us would feel guilt. But most of us do not feel guilt, so it is doubtful that we are 
morally responsible.” In the second Section of this Part, I inquire into his response. 
 Finally, in the last Section of this Part, I draw out some of the implications of the 
insights of the first two sections for philosophical thinking about moral responsibility. 
 
A. Dissidence and Divergent Viewpoints 
The dissident believes that her resistance cancels out whatever responsibility she should 
come to bear in virtue of her commitment to the United States as a whole. She has arrived 
at this self-judgment because she has synthesized the dimension of her identity that flows 
from her citizenship and the dimension of her identity that flows from her dissidence and 
arrived at a coherent conception of herself in which her dissidence is much more 
definitive of who she is. But though each of us is empowered to perform this synthesis 
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and arrive at a self-understanding that makes sense of the disparate and sometimes 
conflicting strands of our identity, none of us is entitled to have others conceive of us as 
we conceive of ourselves. In particular, the dissident cannot legitimately expect that her 
self-understanding will govern the Iraqi’s conception of her; he is entitled to believe that 
citizenship looms larger as a constituent element of an American’s (or anyone’s) identity 
than do acts opposing the policies or practices of one’s government. And, so long as he 
does hold this belief, he will harbor resentment toward the American citizen, no matter 
how valiant her efforts at resistance. 
The divergence just described arises from differing conceptions of the relative 
weights to place upon commitment to one’s nation-state, on the one hand, and resistance 
to its acts, on the other, in constructing the dissident’s individual identity. But there is a 
second possible source of separation between the dissident and the Iraqi that arises from a 
divergence between the conception of America that each harbors. As we have seen, the 
dissident may undertake opposition to the war in Iraq because she conceives of an 
America in which the prosecution of the war in Iraq has been distinctly un-American. 
Indeed, it might be precisely because she harbors a vision of America as different from, 
and better than, the America of recent times that she is motivated to resist, and thereby 
restore her beloved nation-state to her imagined conception of it.58 But just as she must 
recognize that her self-conception is not authoritative for others, so too she must 
recognize that her conception of America must also yield, at least sometimes, to that of 
outsiders. Thus an Iraqi might detect a cultural imperialism in the quest to “liberate” his 
country, and an exceptionalism in the potential impunity with which high-ranking U.S. 
                                                
58 Cf. Dan-Cohen, supra note 34 at 987-88 (“In this vein, Americans’ knowledge that they [would come to 
bear]x responsibility for the Vietnam War in a way that others did not may explain why they were more 
actively opposed to the war than were, say, the English.”). 
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officials have violated the laws of war, that strike him as unmistakably American. Rooted 
in his perspective on America, the Iraqi might find the dissident’s commitment to 
America all the more reproachable. 
Importantly, in each of the sources of resentment just described – the first rooted 
in divergence over the dissident’s identity, and the second rooted in divergence over the 
identity of America – there may be no principled way of adjudicating between the 
competing conceptions. This is not to say that there cannot be cases in which one or the 
other party may be mistaken: the dissident could harbor a kind of false consciousness,59 
or the Iraqi might operate with an unduly prejudiced mindset. In each of these cases, 
evidence could be invoked to bring the mistaken party to see things differently. But I see 
no reason to believe that every case is of this kind. Individuals and nations are complex, 
multi-faceted entities, admitting of multiple constructions and narratives, and there may 
well be several of these that synthesize the constituent elements equally plausibly. In 
short, there may be an unbridgeable gap between the dissident and the Iraqi, and it is in 
the face of this gap that resentment may rightfully take hold. 
Where there is an insuperable divergence regarding the dissident’s 
blameworthiness, we might well want each party to recognize it, and proceed with 
humility. Thus, we might ask that the dissident resist disclaiming responsibility, and the 
Iraqi withhold contempt, despite the fact that each holds fast to his or her respective 
beliefs about the dissident’s relationship to the United States. But we might also allow 
that there are situations in which forbearance is too much to demand. Thus, the Iraqi who 
lost a family member in the Haditha massacre might, given his loss and also his not 
                                                
59 Cf. Karl Jaspers, The Question of German Guilt, E.B. Ashton, transl. (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2001): 97. 
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completely baseless belief in American prejudice against Muslims of middle-eastern 
descent,60 be permitted his resentment.  
Here a kind of cognitive dissonance arises. To inhabit the dissident’s perspective 
on America and herself, the Iraqi must abandon a stance of righteous anger through 
which he might seek to vindicate the worth of his lost loved one, or the Iraqi people as a 
whole. He must instead contend with the notion that he cannot find an outlet in blame for 
his loss and injury that corresponds sufficiently to their (perceived) magnitude. He would 
then incur not just the pain of his tragedy but the profound burden of self-restraint in 
stifling his own sense of the injury and deferring to that of one of his (apparent) injurers. 
Should we really reproach him for spurning this path? Given the additional pain of 
forbearance, is he not entitled to presume the legitimacy of his own perspective, and 
proceed with resentment?61  
Ideally, individuals should be given some latitude in making sense of tragedies 
that befall them. That latitude ought not to be so great that it permits blaming innocents. 
But where one possible interpretation is more comforting than another and the two are 
equally plausible, the more comforting interpretation should prevail. Here, then, the Iraqi 
                                                
60 See, e.g., Chris Hedges and Laila Al-Arian, “The Other War: Iraq Vets Bear Witness,” The Nation, July 
30, 2007, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070730/hedges (“According to the survey, conducted by the 
Office of the Surgeon General of the US Army Medical Command, just 47 percent of soldiers and 38 
percent of marines agreed that [Iraqi] civilians should be treated with dignity and respect.”). Laura 
MacInnis, “U.N. body adopts resolution on religious defamation,” Reuters, March 26, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52P60220090326 (describing a U.N. Human Rights Council anti-
defamation resolution that states, among other things, that some Muslims faced prejudice in the aftermath 
of September 2001). 
61 In principle, there may also be cases in which a dissident might be permitted to disclaim, given how 
violative an ascription of blame for national transgressions is to her vision of her nation-state and herself. I 
assume here, however, that the transgressions committed against Iraqis are so egregious that it wouldn’t be 
plausible to think that the Iraqi victim’s resentment ought to give way to the American dissident’s self-
conception.  
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may legitimately indulge his resentment.62 This does not, of course, entail that the 
dissident is compelled to feel guilt -- feelings, after all, cannot be compelled. Nor does it 
entail that she must internalize the Iraqi’s assessment of her responsibility. But, though 
the dissident may inwardly maintain her innocence, she must nonetheless accept that she 
is an appropriate object of blame. Just as the dissident bears an obligation of loyalty to 
her fellow members to refrain from disavowing the group act, so too she bears an 
obligation of decency to the victims of her group’s transgression to do the same.63 
The foregoing is intended to suggest that the warrant for resentment need not rest 
exclusively on an undeniable wrongdoing. It can instead arise where an individual 
conceives of the harm he suffers as a wrongful injury, and where his understanding of the 
harm is no less reasonable than is the understanding of the resented party. It follows, 
then, that resentment can be justified even when the target of resentment cannot 
recognize her wrongdoing, and this not because she is constitutionally impaired in some 
way (as the psychopath is) but instead because she rejects the victim’s interpretation of 
                                                
62 The philosophical literature on resentment contains a debate about whether resentment is, all things 
considered, a useful emotion or instead one that is self-debasing. Compare Annette Baier, “Hume on 
Resentment,” Hume Studies 6 (1980): 133-149 (arguing that resentment, for Hume, functioned to call 
attention, and thereby reduce, imbalances in power) and Jeffrie Murphy, “Forgiveness and Resentment,” in 
Forgiveness and Mercy, Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 16 (“Resentment … is a good thing for it is essentially tied to a non-controversially good 
thing – self-respect.”) with Friedrich W. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Douglas Smith, trans. 
(New York: OUP, 1999), 24 (“While the noble man lives for himself in trust and openness…, the man of 
ressentiment is neither upright nor naïve in his dealings with others, nor is he honest and open with himself. 
… he has a perfect understanding of how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to make 
himself provisionally small and submissive.”). To the extent that I here promote resentment as an important 
implement in allowing the victim of atrocity to make sense of his lot, I align myself with those who defend 
the usefulness of resentment. 
63 Insofar as the argument here permits us to blame, and hence condemn, someone who is not 
unequivocally culpable, it might be accused of unwarrantedly relying upon a retributivist conception of 
justice. In her contribution to this volume, Erin Kelly exhorts us to abandon retributivist conceptions of 
justice, where retribution is pursued for its own sake, given the natural and social factors that often 
undermine human agency. She nonetheless allows that retribution might be permissible for the sake of 
some other social good. One who is moved by Kelly’s rejection of retributive justice for its own sake might 
nonetheless find no objection with assigning blame to the dissident, given that the assignment may be 
therapeutic for the victim of the wrong, and that the dissident does bear some relationip to the wrong, even 
if not the relationship that retributive justice ought to require.   
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her relationship to the wrong. Correspondingly, indignation can be justified even where 
its target denies wrongdoing, for third-parties too might harbor a conception of the injury 
that implicates someone who does not conceive of herself as culpable, and here too the 
two conceptions may be equally plausible.  
In short, resentment and indignation are meaning-creating emotions, and the 
circumstances in which they are appropriate are not always clear. Where there is genuine 
uncertainty about their warrant, it may well be the case that we ought to defer to the 
interpretation of the injury that confers meaning on the party most in need of making 
sense of his situation.64   
 
B. Citizen Responsibility and the Emotions 
The generic citizen – the one who neither supported nor opposed the war – may insist that 
he too is an inappropriate object of resentment, notwithstanding his commitment to the 
United States. His defense would proceed not by marshaling considerations intended to 
rebut or outweigh that commitment, as the dissident’s defense does; instead, he may just 
maintain, without any false consciousness, that the notion that he must accept blame fails 
to connect emotionally. Underlying his position is the thought that our emotions are 
presumptive guides to moral truth: Contemplating his commitment to the United States, 
he nonetheless feels no guilt over American war crimes in Iraq; he thus concludes that he 
bears no responsibility. What might explain his response? 
                                                
64 Compare Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 70 
(arguing that it may be appropriate for victims of a harm to hold responsible the agent who unintentionally 
caused the harm even though the agent is not a wrongdoer: “Those who have been hurt need a response; 
simply what has happened to them may give them a right to seek it, and where can they look more 
appropriately than to you, the cause?”). 
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One possibility is that the generic citizen suffers from some kind of psychological 
or emotional impairment (e.g., depression, narcissism, etc.) This possibility is reasonable, 
but uninteresting. It is clear that our emotions are not infallible guides to moral truths; we 
do not always respond to moral wrongs with the emotions that we ought. One citizen’s 
failure to respond to abuses in the war in Iraq portends little for the cogency of the claim 
that he is nonetheless responsible. By contrast, a widespread absence of guilt – which is 
characteristic of the American mood these days – is more arresting.65 It is this mood, 
personified in the generic citizen here, that invites inquiry. In this section, I explore the 
implications of the absence of felt guilt for the account of membership responsibility. In 
the next Section, we shall explore the wider metaethical possibilities that arise from the 
notion that blameworthiness need not be accompanied by an experience of guilt, 
resentment or indignation on anyone’s part. 
Others who have contemplated the absence of guilt among members who did not 
participate in a group transgression have raised the possibility that the responsibility of 
these members is not strictly moral responsibility – i.e., responsibility understood as 
appropriate liability to blame; it is instead a highly personal response to a tragedy in 
which one chooses to see one’s agency, though one in fact bears no guilt for the wrong. 
Given that the experience of responsibility is optional on this possibility, the generic 
citizen who disclaims responsibility is then one who has simply opted not to conceive of 
his agency in this way. 
                                                
65 Compare Ariel Dorfman, “Forward: The Tyranny of Terror: Is Torture Inevitable in Our Century and 
Beyond?,” in Torture: A Collection, Sanford Levinson, ed. (New York: OUP, 2004): 8 (“[Torture] 
presupposes, it requires, it craves the abrogation of our capacity to imagine others’ suffering, dehumanizing 
them so much that their pain is not our pain. It demands this of the torturer … but also demands of 
everyone else the same distancing, the same numbness, on the part of those who know and close their eyes, 
those who do not want to know and close their eyes.”) 
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Karl Jaspers is among the exponents of this possibility. Thus he argues that the 
citizen who neither participated nor acquiesced in the Nazi regime bears not moral guilt 
but metaphysical guilt – a kind of guilt arising though its bearer could not have done 
otherwise. He writes of Germans who survived the war: “We did not go into the streets 
when our Jewish friends were led away; we did not scream until we too were destroyed. 
We preferred to stay alive, on the feeble, if logical, ground that our death could not have 
helped anyone. We are guilty of being alive.”66 Similarly, Larry May, who offers a subtle 
reconstruction of Jaspers’ account, agrees that, where a group member did not participate 
in the group harm, and where she could not have prevented it, “moral responsibility, at 
least understood on the model of individual moral guilt, would be inappropriate.”67 
Finally, Herbert Morris refers to the non-moral guilt the American who visits Hiroshima 
shortly after World War II might experience – non-moral because its bearer is, by 
hypothesis, without fault for the Hiroshima bombings.68  
Importantly, for each of these theorists, whether the member who did not 
participate in the group transgression conceives of herself as bearing responsibility for 
that transgression is a matter over which she alone has authority. For Jaspers, the German 
citizen’s metaphysical guilt is something no one else can “prescribe” or “anticipate”;69 
whereas others may sit in judgment where political or legal guilt is concerned, 
“[j]urisdiction for [metaphysical guilt] rests with God alone.”70 May also seems to 
recognize the optional character of metaphysical guilt. Identification with the group is the 
                                                
66 Jaspers, supra note 59 at 68 
67 May, Sharing Responsibility, supra note 30 at 152. 
68 Herbert Morris, “Nonmoral Guilt,” in in Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: New Essays in 
Moral Psychology, Ferdinand Schoeman, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 237-40. 
69 Jaspers, supra note 59 at 68. 
70 Id. at 26.  
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ground of moral taint for May, and he acknowledges that the degree, or even the 
presence, of such identification may be up to the individual. Thus, he notes that, “for 
members who are only on the fringe of the community… the group identification may be 
so weak as to not generate feelings of metaphysical guilt.”71 For Morris, non-moral guilt 
also rests upon identification with the wrongdoer; in particular, he argues that it arises 
where the individual who is blameless nonetheless identifies with the one who is 
blameworthy, whether a family member or even just a fellow human being.72 Reasonably 
enough, then, he contends that “[w]e may not ask of ourselves or of others that guilt be 
felt in these situations.”73  
 Underlying each of these accounts is the thought that an individual has full 
discretion about whether she will harbor the identificatory ties upon which the experience 
of responsibility is purportedly predicated. Since, on these theories, these ties may not be 
mandated from without, neither may the sense of responsibility that they yield.  
 These theorists may well be right that identification is discretionary in some 
cases; it is not, however, discretionary in the context of an institutional group like the 
United States, as I sought to argue in the last section. Instead, as we saw, American 
citizenship has a normative dimension that compels the citizen to accept blame for U.S. 
transgressions. To understand the generic citizen’s response to the claim that he is 
responsible, then, we will have to look to something other than theories that entertain 
discretionary guilt experiences. 
                                                
71 May, supra note 30 at 153. 
72 E.g., Morris, supra note 68 at 240. 
73 Id. at 237.  
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 An inquiry into the natural history of guilt provides useful insights. Guilt, as 
Herbert Morris notes, “is a painful state.”74 One can trace the unpleasant sensation 
accompanying guilt by way of an evolutionary account that looks to the practical effect of 
our emotional life. On such an account, the unpleasantness of guilt is useful for its power 
to regulate behavior. We come to associate certain courses of conduct with this pain and 
refrain from pursuing them in order to avoid suffering this pain.75 From an evolutionary 
standpoint, it makes sense that guilt should have naturally evolved in connection with 
wrongs in which we played a causal role, given that the unpleasantness of guilt functions 
to deter us from future wrongdoing. The natural history of guilt thereby privileges those 
acts in which our agency is substantially implicated. Correspondingly, for acts in which 
our causal role is remote or non-existent, guilt may not be activated.76 
Importantly, the thought here is not that our relationship to those wrongs of our 
nation-state in which we did not participate causes us to experience some feeling that we 
cannot name. Instead, the impoverishment resides in our emotional vocabulary: we are 
bereft of the capacity to feel in the face of wrongs in which our agency is not salient. It is 
perhaps for this reason that Karl Jaspers refers to the German citizen’s failure to wage a 
fruitless opposition against the Nazi regime as metaphysical guilt, a species of guilt 
                                                
74 Morris, supra note 32 at 89. 
75 Compare Joseph Butler, “Sermon VIII: Upon Resentment and Forgiveness of Injuries,” in Fifteen 
Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, Leroy Dagg, transcribed (2002), 
http://anglicanhistory.org/butler/rolls/08.html (arguing that, where virtue fails, individuals may nonetheless 
be deterred from pursuing wrongdoing by the anticipated unpleasantness of the resentment their 
wrongdoing would elicit). 
76 Compare Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 135-138 (describing guilt as the experience an individual ought to 
have in the face acts that reveal that she is insufficiently motivated to engage in cooperation and 
reciprocity, and arguing that others’ anger in the face of anti-social conduct will tend to induce the guilty 
party to make amends, thereby restoring faith that she is suitably prepared to cooperate).  
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whose phenomenological component seems utterly mysterious.77 It is also perhaps for 
this reason that others who have contemplated the possibility of a sense of responsibility 
in the absence of wrongdoing have identified shame, rather than guilt, as its attendant 
emotion.78 
If guilt does have the natural history just described, then we should not expect 
cases of wrongdoing that do not fit the paradigm – again, a paradigm in which we bear 
significant causal responsibility for the wrongs for which we are held responsible79 – to 
elicit the feeling of guilt. And, without the phenomenological correlates of guilt, the 
judgment that we are guilty may not be accessible to us through the first-personal 
experiences upon which we typically rely to illuminate the moral character of our acts. 
But the impediment to experiencing guilt need not entail that we do not bear a 
reproachable connection to the wrongdoing. An understanding of guilt’s evolutionary 
role opens up the possibility, then, that our emotional life may track only a subset of the 
wrongs for which we bear responsibility. This possibility warrants further consideration. 
                                                
77 Jaspers, supra note 59 at 68. I do not mean to endorse here the part of Jasper’s account that leaves the 
experience of metaphysical guilt to the individual’s conscience. Nonetheless, the term “metaphysical guilt” 
may well be apt for cases in which one views oneself as culpable in a wrong for which one is not causally 
responsible. 
78 See, e.g., Morris, supra note 32 at 137 (describing the experience of non-moral guilt as “a feeling of 
shame, perhaps before God, because of the evil done by any human being, as if some defect in us were 
revealed by what any human being did.”); May, supra note 30 at 155 (“moral shame or taint may be the 
appropriate moral feeling” in instances “when a person’s causal agency is not in question, or at least when 
the causal role one played did not make a difference in the world.”) 
79 I use the “significant” qualifier because I believe that the citizen does bear a causal relationship to the 
wrongs of her nation-state, though not one that itself grounds her responsibility. Elsewhere, I have argued 
that all citizens furnish the nation-state’s capacity to act by sustaining the identity of the nation-state over 
time, and preserving the rules according to which the acts of some citizens qualify as acts of the nation-
state. See Sepinwall, supra note 55. To that extent, all citizens causally contribute to the nation-state’s acts. 
But this notion of causality is atypical. In everyday ascriptions of causal responsibility, causality is 
restricted to instances when one’s contribution made a difference to the outcome. Insofar as no individual 
citizen can be said to have made a difference in furnishing the nation-state’s capacity to act, it is not 
inappropriate to think that the casual contribution flowing from citizenship alone is insufficient to make 
each and every citizen causally responsible for each and every act of the nation-state. To say that the 
generic citizen does not bear a significant causal relationship to a transgression of the nation-state is, then, 
just to say that he did not participate in the transgression in question.  
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C. Citizen Responsibility and Licensed Blame  
I have argued that resentment may be appropriate even though guilt is not (the case of the 
dissident), and that one may bear guilt even though the feeling of guilt is universally 
absent or even universally inaccessible (the case of the generic citizen). As I have 
characterized them, then, these cases sit uncomfortably alongside several core ideas 
within philosophical understandings of moral responsibility. In particular, these cases 
challenge the idea that judgments of moral responsibility are constituted by a particular 
triad of reactive attitudes, and the idea that judgments of responsibility are constituted by 
reactive attitudes in general. Most fundamentally, these cases challenge the notion that 
blameworthiness presupposes guilt. I elaborate on each of these implications in turn.  
In the literature linking responsibility and the reactive attitudes, it is nearly a 
gospel truth that guilt, resentment, and indignation co-travel.80 More specifically, on 
these accounts – which we may call Strawsonian after Peter Strawson’s seminal paper -- 
one and the same transgression is supposed to induce guilt in the person who carries it 
out, resentment in its victim, and indignation in third-parties who learn of it.81 But I have 
argued that, in the case of the dissident, the supposed triad of guilt, resentment and 
indignation dissolves: The dissident may be an appropriate object of resentment and 
                                                
80 See, e.g., Peter Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, John 
Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza eds., (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,1993), 56-57 (referring to 
resentment and indignation as “kindred” reactive attitudes, and to guilt as the “correlate” of these two); 
Williams, supra note 64 at 89 (“What arouses guilt in an agent is an act or omission of a sort that typically 
elicits from other people anger, resentment or indignation.”). R. Jay Wallace has argued that the reactive 
attitudes should consist only of guilt, resentment and indignation. R. Jay Wallace, “Emotions and 
Expectations,” in Free Will: Critical Concepts in Philosophy, John Martin Fischer, ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 145.  
81 Strawson, supra note 80 at 57. 
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indignation even if she need not conceive of herself as guilty. In other words, there may 
be asymmetries between the self-reactive attitudes and other-directed reactive attitudes. 
The situation for the Strawsonian gets worse when we turn to the reflections on 
the natural history of guilt marshaled above. For the Strawsonian, moral salience is 
brought to light through the emotions. If I am right that our emotional vocabulary is 
limited where our causal agency is absent, however, then there may be a whole swath of 
acts or outcomes for which we bear responsibility and to which we are blind. The 
blindness becomes troubling where it is not universal – in particular, where victims or 
third-parties assign responsibility to us and we are incapable of experiencing the 
corresponding self-assessment. But it is also possible that our relationship to some wrong 
will elicit no guilt, no resentment and no indignation. This possibility arises because 
those who judge us may be no less primed to view responsibility through a causal lens 
than we are, and so they too might overlook the fact that we – now cast as generic 
members of institutional groups in whose transgressions we have not participated – 
deserve blame. On this possibility, then, there would be blameworthiness that no emotion 
could disclose. And yet it is not clear that the interests or status of the individuals affected 
by the blameworthy act would thereby warrant any less vindication.  
Finally, it is not just the Strawsonian understanding of responsibility that occludes 
judgments of responsibility in cases where we bear a non-causal relationship to the 
wrong. It is a commonplace across the literature on responsibility that it is a necessary 
condition of X’s being morally responsible for Y that it be appropriate for X to 
experience guilt in relation to Y.82 But the account of citizen responsibility I have 
                                                
82 See, e.g., Gibbard, supra note 76 at 126 (“a person is to blame for something if it would make sense for 
him to feel guilty for having done it….”); Stephen Darwall, The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, 
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advanced dispenses with the supposedly necessary connection between moral 
responsibility and the appropriateness of guilt. More specifically, on my account, one 
need not experience guilt in relation to some wrong in order to bear moral responsibility 
for it; sometimes, the fact that others would be licensed in blaming us is enough to 
ground our moral responsibility. 
In sum, then, the account of responsibility advanced here entails not only a 
dissolution of the guilt-resentment-indignation triad. That account also exposes the 
implicit primacy accorded to guilt, relative to the other two members of the triad, and it 
invites us to unseat guilt from its pride of place, and replace it with resentment instead. In 
the face of legitimate disagreement about the warrant for blame, it is, then, victims, and 
not wrongdoers, whose perspectives should prevail.  
More generally, the account of membership responsibility implies that we may be 
implicated in wrongs in ways that we do not feel and do not see. Our moral reality may 
then transcend the scope of our emotional awareness. As such, we ought to be open to the 
possibility that we bear responsibility for more of the transgressions of our nation-state 
than we think. Americans, that is, ought to be open to the possibility that they bear 
responsibility for U.S. war crimes committed in the course of the war in Iraq.83  
                                                                                                                                            
Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 71 (“Guilt feels like the 
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